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Abstract
This article is intended as a compendium and guide to the variety of Bell
Inequality derivations that have appeared in the literature in recent years,
classifying them into six broad categories, revealing the underlying, often hid-
den, assumption common to each - semifactuality. Evaluation of the attendant
conditional brings to light a significant EPR loophole that has not appeared in
the literature. Semantics for the inequality in the ongoing philosophic debate
that led to its discovery is discussed.
1 Overview
There are many derivations of the Bell Inequality in the literature, most if not all of
which can be classified into one or more of six categories that sometime overlap. Here
we show that when it does not make an explicit appearance, semifactual-definiteness
is the implicit assumption key to valid derivation in each category. Next, as our
main result, we show the conventional Bell Inequality semifactual to be inconsistent,
whereupon we present a self-consistent one which on evaluation reveals a highly
restrictive constraint necessary for application of the inequality to EPR experimental
data. Finally we consider the meaning of the inequality and offer criticism of the
philosophic debate that led to its discovery.
In section 1 we motivate and in 2 review the EPR paradox. Sections 3.1 and
3.2 follow with distinct Bell inequality derivations; the next derivation in section
3.3 may be understood as a algebraic variation of either of the preceding two. Sec-
tion 4 points out the shortcoming common to these derivations and presents in the
derivations of 4.1 and 4.2 the random detector-setting condition as a remedy. Im-
plementation of the condition is considered in section 5 by way of an analysis of
the commonly associated semifactual. This semifactual is found to be inconsistent
with EPR experimental realities, and in 5.1 we introduce in its place an appropri-
ate self-consistent semifactual. In section 6 we consider the resulting experimental
constraints and conduct a concluding discussion in section 7. In 7.1 we leave the
student with a final thought by way of a popular style of Bell Inequality derivation
- there a variant of the elementary set theory derivation of 3.2.
2 Indeterminacy
Young’s double-slit experiment provides the classic and excellent illustration of the
interplay between randomness and correlation peculiar to small-scale phenomena.
A stream of identical electrons emitted by a source falls on an opaque screen pierced
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by two narrow slits and then illuminates a second phosphorous screen, where the
electrons collectively produce a pattern of alternating bright and dark fringes - bright
where they land, dark where they generally do not.
figure 1
This is the same sort of pattern created by a pair of water-wave point sources (along
a surface perpendicular to the bi-section), waves alternatingly in and out of phase,
interfering constructively and destructively, respectively
3
figure 2
Monochromatic light will also produce this pattern when placed behind the double-
slit.
The experimental results are
• When only one slit is open the interference pattern disappears.
• When the two single slit intensities are superimposed, the interference pattern
still does not appear.
These observations suggest that the interference results from a phenomena existing
between the slits, perhaps interactions between electrons that pass through opposite
slits simultaneously. To test the idea we might send the electrons through at a slow
rate, one at a time, separating them by large distances so as to prevent the possibility
of such an interaction. When this is done the same interference pattern gradually,
mysteriously, emerges with the arrival of electrons (fig 3).
4
figure 3
And so it seems that in some sense a single electron passes through both slits si-
multaneously, interfering with itself much like a wave would. Such an electron has
of course no definite trajectory, and the associated spatial uncertainty is manifest
at the observation screen where the electron lands unpredictably, though, as also
predicted by quantum mechanics, most probably on or near a bright fringe.
According to the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics this unpredictabil-
ity, or randomness, is fundamental to the measurement process and cannot be gotten
around. It does not depend for example on the resolving power of the measuring
devices used to take data, but is always present whenever ”complementary” quanti-
ties are observed, such as an electron’s position and momentum. Thus the effective
vertical position measurement at the double slits creates a complementary uncer-
tainty in the vertical momentum which from a given slit determines the electron’s
final position at the observation screen.
One will often have had occasion to observe similar random behavior in large-scale,
or macroscopic, phenomena. Take for example a set of approach-shot lies from
a typical practice session of golf. A player on a good run has found his or her
touch. Yet, after a series of shots from one spot the lies are never identical, varying
randomly over some area
5
figure 4
Why? Because of variations in the player’s stroke? Maybe. But would there not
remain some random variation even if the strokes were identical, say, if the player
were replaced by a mechanical swinging device? Probably. Such variation might be
due e.g. to wind fluctuation, variation in green speeds, various random vibrations
from distant events, etc., any number of less than obvious causes. But what if the
mechanical device were programmed to take these factors into account as well so
as to progressively refine its stroke? Then one would expect the accuracy also to
progressively improve, in principle without limit, lies approaching an ace.
Physicists are in general agreement that predictions of macroscopic events like these
golf shots may be improved upon indefinitely by progressively taking into account
the relevant physical variables: wind resistance, orbital motion of the earth, motion
of distant galaxies, etc., ad-infinitum. Why then would this not also be true of
the microscopic, such as those events in the Young’s double-slit experiment? On
this question physicists are not in agreement and have not been since the inception
of quantum mechanics almost a century ago. Many are not prepared to accept
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as fundamental the randomness observed in microscopic phenomena, though fewer
today than in former times.
To these such an acceptance goes against the very program of physics which is
to understand the events that make up physical reality - and from understanding,
to predict. In this way of thinking then there must exist physically deterministic
variables relevant to Young’s double-slit experiment and the like, no less than there
are for golf, even if these variables are at the moment unknown or hidden from us.
Quantum mechanics is thus understood to give an incomplete account of physical
reality, just as a theory that described the physics of golf which, however, ignored
air resistance also paints a physically incomplete picture, although such a theory
might well yield reliable probability predictions.
3 EPR argument
Foremost among the dissenters from orthodox view was Albert Einstein, who at the
Fifth Physical Conference of the Solvay Institute held in Brussels, 1927, presented
several arguments designed to demonstrate the reality of unobserved phenomena and
hence the incompleteness of quantum mechanics. He found especially disturbing the
growing belief among his contemporaries that not only may knowledge of one of a
system’s physical attributes preclude simultaneous knowledge of others (e.g., mo-
mentum and position of a particle), but that they may not simultaneously exist - the
principle of complementarity thought to be codified in the Heisenberg uncertainty
relations, e.g.
∆x∆p ≥ h¯ (1)
where the uncertainties here measure a quantity’s spread about its experimental
mean. It was also at the Solvay V meeting that Heisenberg, representing the or-
thodox view and in open opposition to Einstein, pronounced quantum mechanics a
theory full and complete, not subject to further modification.
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Einstein argued by way of thought experiments, sometimes called gadanken experi-
ments, one of which involved the analysis of a variation on the double-slit experiment.
In it the opaque screen in which the double slits are made now moves freely in the
vertical plane, sensitive to minute vertical momentum transfer
figure 5
As a horizontally moving electron clears a slit it acquires vertical momentum, which
from momentum conservation is balanced by the opposite vertical momentum of the
opaque screen. The screen’s momentum might then be measured to arbitrary accu-
racy by an attached meter, thus reducing the momentum spread, ∆p, indefinitely,
independent of the position spread at the observation screen, ∆x, in violation of (1).
Leading the orthodox side at the conference was Niels Bohr of the University of
Copenhagen where much of the quantum mechanics conceptual work had been done,
whence the name “Copenhagen interpretation” often used in reference to the ortho-
dox view. To this argument Bohr cautioned that not only do microscopic objects
obey quantum mechanics, but macroscopic objects also. If, e.g., the attached mea-
suring device is capable of resolving upper from lower slit momentum transfer for
an electron that eventually lands on a given bright fringe, then classically we must
have
∆ps ≤ |pu − pl| ≃ hν|θu − θl| ≃ (ha)/(λd)
and for the opaque screen, from (1), quantum mechanically
∆xs ≥ h/∆ps ≥ (λd)/a (2)
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which is just the separation between observation screen lines. The opaque screen
position spread accordingly affects that measured at the observation screen, ∆x,
here to the extent that distinct observation screen lines will not even appear, and
so demonstrating a correlation between complementary spreads, ∆x&∆p, dramat-
ically. The Solvay V participants seem generally to have accepted this explanation.
Bohr had similar success with the other various thought experiments presented then
by Einstein, likewise those presented three years later at Solvay VI 1.
Still sure of his intuition, two years after Solvay VI Einstein in collaboration with
Podolsky and Rosen made another attempt to demonstrate the incompleteness of
quantum mechanics. The result has been called the EPR paradox [1]. Key to the
approach is the meaning given to the term “physically real” for which they propose
the sufficient condition
If without in any way disturbing a system we can predict with certainty (i.e.,
with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there
exists an element of physical reality corresponding to the physical quantity.
With this definition they then analyze the case of an isolated bound state particle
that decays into two identical mass constituents
P = 0
p1  x1 p2  x2
bound state
detector1 detector2
figure 6
P = p1 + p2 = 0
X = x1 + x2 = 0
1The Einstein-Bohr debate, as it has been called, spanned several years, involving many aux-
iliary players. An excellent historical account can be found in Max Jammer’s The Philosophy of
Quantum Mechanics New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (1974)
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Strict conservation for the isolated system, their argument begins, yields p1 upon
a momentum measurement on particle-2 without in any way disturbing particle-1.
To insure this required measurement-independence the momentum measurement is
assumed to take place at a distance remote from particle-1, a space-like distance
which by special relativity prevents a causal relation between the two events (bar-
ring, in the words of Einstein, some “spooky action-at-a-distance”). Momentum
p1 is thereby guaranteed to be real. But the position of particle-2, the argument
continues, could just as well have been measured instead of its momentum, again
without in any way disturbing particle-1. The position of particle-1, x1, is therefore
also real. In this way the quantum mechanical description of reality in which the
pair (x1,p1) is complementary and so do not be simultaneously exist is shown to be
logically incomplete.
The resolution of the paradox eventually offered by Bohr within the framework of
the Copenhagen view is generally thought to be less convincing than those of his
earlier successes. The paradox follows from two main assumptions:
1. Elements of reality are measurement independent (i.e., measurements only
reveal a pre-existing reality ), the reality assumption.
2. Information cannot be exchanged between space-like separated events, the
Locality assumption, sometimes called the assumption of Einstein Separability.
The present orthodox view indirectly predicts a violation of assumption 2 for the ex-
ample above by way of an instantaneous global change in the total two-particle wave
function (called a “collapse”) upon measurement on either of the particles. A test
of the assumption would entail an analysis of space-like separated pair-observations,
with correlations going to support the orthodox view, and their absence, the EPR
view.
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4 Bell inequality
The EPR experiment as described above would be difficult to carry out in practice,
not least because the two measurements would have to be made simultaneously due
to the steady spreading (dispersion) of the particles’ wave-packets. And from the
outset few if any physicists gave serious thought to conducting such an experiment.
Then in 1951 David Bohm proposed a more hopeful version of the paradox [2] in
which the complementary quantities to be measured are particle spin-projections
along distinct axis
S = 0
s1 s2
bound state
detector1 detector2
figure 7
In this case the pair-wise measurements need not be made simultaneously. The
empirical facts that have come to be known are
1. Measurement of an individual particle spin along any axis yields one of only
two possible outcomes, either spin-up or spin-down.
2. When the two detectors measure along the same axis the outcomes are invari-
ably opposite, one spin-up, the other spin-down (perfect anti-correlation).
3. When the two detectors measure along different axis the outcomes are mixed,
sometimes equal, sometimes opposite.
4.1 Joint-distribution derivations
Let us consider then a large number of such runs with projections measured ran-
domly along the three directions, aˆ, bˆ,&cˆ,
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s1
s2
A
B
C
figure 8
selected respectively by detector settings A, B, and C, in the end grouping like
results. By N(a+; b+)exp we shall designate the number of pair-measurements taken
with detector-1 set to direction a and detector-2 to b, both yielding spin-up. In the
realist view, such as Einstein’s, each decay state counted in N(a+; b+)exp had before
measurement the property that particle-1 would measure spin-up along direction
a and particle 2 along direction b. Accordingly, N(a+; b+)exp is also the number
of pre-observation states that would later, upon measurement, be observed to have
spin-up in directions a and b respectively for particles 1 and 2. To distinguish the
pre-observation frequencies we omit the subscript, though the two numbers are of
course equal.
N(a+; b+) = N(a+; b+)exp (3)
For the pre-observation states, however, we may also write
N(a+; b+) = N(a+; b+, c+) +N(a+; b+, c−)
= N(a+, c+; b+) +N(a+, c−; b+) (4)
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from completeness, where the second index on either side of the argument semicolon
gives the experimental outcome in case the projection were measured in a different
direction ( above, direction c ) from that given by the first index. In this notation the
semicolon separates particle-1 from particle-2 projections, commas separating the
projections within the set of particle-1 or particle-2 projections. The first particle-1
and particle-2 indices give the physical detector setting for that measurement, the
second, where there is one, a hypothetical setting. The expansion follows from the
reality assumption-1 above.
For the measurements considered in fig (8) we have then,
N(a+; b+) ≥ N(a+; b+, c+) = N(a+; c+, b+) (5)
and
N(b+; c+) ≥ N(b+; c+, a−) = N(a+; c+, b−)
so that
N(a+; b+) +N(b+; c+) ≥ N(a+; c+, b+) +N(a+; c+, b−)
or
N(a+; b+) +N(b+; c+) ≥ N(a+; c+) (6)
This is one form of a Bell Inequality (BI) [3].
4.2 Elementary set-theory derivations
For a different derivation we first group the particles to be observed at detector-1,
particle-1s, into sets according to their positive spin projections. Let set A consist
of all such particle-1s with projection spin-up along direction a. Likewise sets B and
C for directions b and c , respectively. From elementary set algebra then we have
A ∩ B¯ ∪ B ∩ C¯ ⊇ A ∩ C¯ (7)
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giving
η(A ∩ B¯) + η(B ∩ C¯) ≥ η(A ∩ C¯) (8)
where η is a cardinality operator that counts the number of set elements. In terms
of the number of particle-1s with given spin projections we have
η(A ∩ B¯) = N(a+, not− b+)
where now both N arguments (separated by a comma) are particle-1 projections.
This yields from (8)
N(a+, not− b+) +N(b+, not− c+) ≥ N(a+, not− c+) (9)
from which observed spin conservation obtains
N(a+; b+) +N(b+; c+) ≥ N(a+; c+) (10)
where by convention the semicolon again separates particle-1 from particle-2 pro-
jections. A Bell inequality [4].
4.3 Expectation-value derivations
In quantum mechanics N(a+; b+) is proportional to the joint probability of mea-
suring particle-1 spin-up along direction a and particle 2 spin-up along direction
b
n(a+; b+) = 〈0, 0|1
2
(1 + σ1 · a)1
2
(1 + σ2 · b)|0, 0〉 (11)
=
1
2
sin2(
1
2
θab)
Bell’s inequality often appears in the literature as a relation between expectation
values. The singlet-state product spin projection expectation for particles 1 and 2
along directions a and b, respectively, is given by
P (a;b) = 〈0, 0|σ1 · aσ2 · b|0, 0〉 = 4n(a+; b+)− 1
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yielding from (10) above
P (a;b) + P (b; c) ≥ P (a; c)− 1 (12)
[5, 24]. It happens that quantum mechanics predicts a violation of the Bell Inequal-
ity. From (10)
sin2(
1
2
θab) + sin
2(
1
2
θbc) ≥ sin2(1
2
θac)
which is violated e.g. for relative detector settings θab = θbc = pi/8, θac = pi/4 .
These give
2 sin2(pi/8) ≥ sin2(pi/4)
.29 ≥ .5
The predictions of quantum mechanics and its realist interpretation ( leading from
assumptions 1 and 2 above ) appear to be at variance. The experimental data to
date tends to agree with quantum mechanics.
5 The inequality reconsidered
We now take a closer look at the derivations and consider a couple of others. Re-
call that the inequality relates classes of EPR experimental data where detectors
1 and 2 of figure(8) are set to all combinations of directions a,b, and c for an in-
definitely large number of measurements. For each individual detector setting the
measurement result is either spin-up or spin down. We designate by Ω the set of
all pre-observation particle-pair states to be measured, and by A, B, and C, as be-
fore, the sets of states in Ω in which particle-1 has positive spin projection along
directions a,b, and c, respectively. We then have again relation (7)
η(A ∩ B¯) + η(B ∩ C¯) ≥ η(A ∩ C¯)
which we illustrate here by Venn diagram
15
AB C

A

B

C
Ω
figure 9
or in terms of Venn sections
+ + + ≥ +
figure 10
By N˜(a+; b+) we designate the number of states in Ω that have positive spin pro-
jections along a and b for particles 1 and 2 (of a pair), respectively. Then
N˜(a+; b+) = η(A ∩ B¯)
yielding from cardinality relation (8)
N˜(a+; b+) + N˜(b+; c+) ≥ N˜(a+; c+) (13)
an inequality similar to Bell’s (10).
To investigate the relation first recall that an expression N(α+; β+) appearing in
(10), like its experimental counterpart N(α+; β+)exp, represents the number of states
in Ω that have positive spin projections along α and β for particles 1 and 2 (of a pair)
that will be observed at detectors 1 and 2 along directions α and β , respectively.
The set of pairs counted in N(α; β) is therefore only a subset of the set of pairs in
the corresponding N˜(α; β); some of those in N˜(α; β) may be counted in N(α′; β ′).
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Then let Ωαβ ⊆ Ω designate the set of states in Ω and Aαβ ⊆ A the set of states in
A upon which detectors 1 and 2 eventually measure spins along directions α and β,
respectively, so that N bears the same relation to Ωαβ and Aαβ as N˜ to Ω and A. In
terms of the three quantities with observed counterparts, N(a+; b+), N(b+; c+), and
N(a+; b+) , we therefore have in the double entry notation for N˜ .
N˜(a+; b+) = N(a+; b+) +N(a+; c+, b+)
N˜(b+; c+) = N(b+; c+) +N(a+, b+; c+)
N˜(a+; c+) = N(a+; c+) +N(a+; b+, c+) +N(b+, a+; c+)
which upon substitution into inequality (13) yields
N(a+; b+) +N(b+; c+) ≥ N(a+; c+) (14)
+[N(a+; b+, c+)−N(a+; c+, b+)] + [N(b+, a+; c+)−N(a+, b+; c+)]
reducing to BI (10) on the condition that
N(a+; b+, c+) +N(b+, a+; c+) = N(a+; c+, b+) +N(a+, b+; c+) (15)
or equivalently, from spin conservation, on the condition that
N(a+; b+, c+) +N(b+; c+, a−) = N(a+; c+, b+) +N(a+; c+, b−) = N(a+; c+)
the hidden assumption, equation (5), which led to Bell inequality (6). Justification
of this assumption is main the subject of the remainder of this article.
Let us consider the assumption first by way of various Venn diagrams, keeping
in mind the singlet state condition, N˜(α;α, β) = 0
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AB C
A
B C
A
B C
N(b+a+;c+)~
→
N(b+a−;c+)~
→
N(a+;c+b−)~
→
N(a+;c+b+)~
←
N(a+;b+c+)~
←
N(a+;b+;c−)~
→
Ω ΩΩ
figure 11
Observe that A B and C overlap, and that
η(A ∩ B¯ ∩ C¯) = N˜(a+; b+, c+) = N˜(a+; c+, b+) (16)
and
η(A ∩ B ∩ C¯) = N˜(b+, a+; c+) = N˜(a+, b+; c+)
By contrast, for the three disjoint subscripted sets Ωαβ relevant to quantities ap-
pearing in (10)
Aab
Bab Cab 
Aac
Bac Cac
Abc
Bbc Cbc
N(b+a+;c+)
→
N(b+a−;c+)
→
N(a+;c+b−)
→
N(a+;c+b+)
←
N(a+;b+c+)
←
N(a+;b+;c−)
→
Ωbc ΩacΩab
figure 12
as the distributions are generally distinct. Then, generally
η(Aab ∩ B′ab ∩ C ′ab) = N(a+; b+, c+) (17)
6= N(a+; c+, b+) = η(Aac ∩ C ′ac ∩ B′ac)
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and
η(Bbc ∩ Abc ∩ C ′bc) = N(b+, a+; c+) 6= N(a+, b+; c+) = η(Aac ∩Bac ∩ C ′ac)
This observation contradicts (5) and (15) upon which derivations (6) and (10) de-
pend. The skewed spin-projection distributions pictured in the Venn diagrams (12)
we illustrate alternatively by superimposing on the Ω sample space of diagram (11)
figure 13
where
α ≡ Aab ∩ B′ab ∩ C ′ab
β ≡ Aac ∩ C ′ac ∩ B′ac
γ ≡ Aac ∩Bac ∩ C ′ac
ρ ≡ Bbc ∩ Abc ∩ C ′bc
Contrasting relations (16) and (17) may also be understood in terms of the N and
N˜ number notation itself. From construction, the first particle indices of N alone
refer to actual observations and may therefore not be transposed without further
assumptions.
5.1 Random-selection derivations
One such assumption, or condition, is that detector directions be chosen from a,b,
and c randomly. This approach has the added advantage of avoiding the suspect
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incompatible joint probabilities [6] N(α; βγ) and N(α, not− β) used above. Under
this assumption sample space Ω of fig (13) approaches homogeneity in Ωab,Ωbc, and
Ωac which may be pictured
figure 14
from which, visually
N(a+; b+, c+) +N(b+; c+, a−) ≃ N(a+; c+, b+) +N(a+; c+, b−),
for the case of interest where η(Ωab) ≃ η(Ωbc) ≃ η(Ωac).
This randomness is attained on the condition that the observed relative frequencies
n(α; β) ∝ N(α; β) remain invariant under variation in place-selection, the order or
sequence in which pair projections along the various directions are measured. When
this is achieved we have
n(α+; β+) = n˜(α+; β+) (18)
where n˜(α; β) ∝ N˜(α; β), so that
N(α+; β+) ∝ N˜(α+; β+)
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which from (13) yields the Bell Inequality [6].
N(a+; b+) +N(b+; c+) ≥ N(a+; c+) (19)
From (18) also follows equations (5) and (15), and hence Bell inequality (6) and
(10).
5.2 Stochastic hidden-variable derivations
The biased spin-projection distribution pictured in fig(13) is sometimes described
by classical local hidden variables [17, 14, 5, 21, 22, 24] collectively denoted λ
figure 15
where the states measured along directions α and β for particles 1 and 2, respec-
tively( i.e., those in Ωαβ) are characterized by hidden variables {λαβ} . with accom-
panying classical probability densities
ρ(λ′) = ραβ for λ
′ ∈ {λαβ}.
Predictions for measured frequencies then take the form (cf. (11))
nexp(α+; β+) = n(α+; β+)
= NΩαβ
∫
Ωαβ
dλρ(λ)〈0, 0;λ|1
2
(1 + σ1 ·α)1
2
(1 + σ2 · β)|0, 0;λ〉
21
where the integration is carried out over sub-ensemble Ωαβ , NΩαβ functioning as a
normalization constant. On the other hand
n˜(α+; β+) = NΩ
∫
Ω
dλρ(λ)〈0, 0;λ|1
2
(1 + σ1 ·α)1
2
(1 + σ2 · β)|0, 0;λ〉.
Similarly, we have for the expectation values (cf. (12)),
P (α;β) = NΩαβ
∫
Ωαβ
dλρ(λ)〈0, 0;λ|σ1 ·ασ2 · β|0, 0;λ〉.
From the algebraic identity
− 1 ≤ ab+ bc− ac+ b2 − 2b ≤ 0
one might say
−1 ≤ σ1 · aσ2 · b+ σ1 · bσ2 · c− σ1 · aσ2 · c
+σ1 · bσ2 · b− σ1 · b− σ2 · b ≤ 0
with regard to its expectation value. Operating then from the right with ket |0, 0;λ〉
and from the left with NΩdλρ(λ)〈0, 0;λ| yields upon integration over Ω [14, 20, 21,
22, 23, 27]
P˜ (a;b) + P˜ (b; c) ≥ P˜ (a; c)− 1 (20)
with
P˜ (α;β) = NΩ
∫
Ω
dλρ(λ)〈0, 0;λ|σ1 ·ασ2 · β|0, 0;λ〉.
which on the stochastic condition by which, again, observed relative frequencies
remain invariant under variation in place-selection, yields
P (α;β) = P˜ (α;β) (21)
and Bell Inequality (12).
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The stochastic condition is equivalent to the condition - in the language of the
quantum mechanics canonical formalism - that the experimental state-preparation
density matrix remain independent of detector settings, the place-selection sequence.
I.e., that
∫
dλραβ |0, 0;λ〉〈0, 0;λ| ≃
∫
dλρα′β′ |0, 0;λ〉〈0, 0;λ|
6 The Semifactual
In the usual statistics problem it is safe to assume that successive place-selections
are taken over identical or sufficiently similar sequences of sample events, that the
sample sequence and associated selection sequence remain mutually independent.
This however is not the usual case, and with regard to possibly unknown or “hid-
den” factors the experimentalist is obliged to take special precaution to prevent
the transfer of information from selection to sample. The recommended precaution
in every case of which I am aware has been that there be established space-like
separations between a detector’s measurement on a particle and the corresponding
opposite particle of the pair whose spin-projection is presently measured at the op-
posite detector. The opposite particle will then, presumably, have no way of knowing
how to adjust its spin direction so as to produce with the other measurements the
observed correlations - no way, that is, barring superluminal information transfer.
This condition may also be applied directly to expressions N(α+; β+, γ+) [16, 28]
to yield (5) and (15). On the other hand, we illustrate the general relation, i.e.
a sample dependence on selection, for the ith selection sequence with the sample
sequence given in terms of its hidden variable
23
mth  variable
of the
ith  selection Siab(m)            Sibc(m)            Siac(m)
λi1 ∈ { λbc }
λi2 ∈ { λab }
λi3 ∈ { λac }
λi4 ∈ { λbc }
λi5 ∈ { λac }
λi6 ∈ { λab }
λi7 ∈ { λac }
λi8 ∈ { λbc }
λi9 ∈ { λbc }
λi10 ∈ { λab }
λiM ∈ { λac }
ni(a+;b+)          ni(b+;c+)          ni(a+;c+) 
 √  
 √  
 √  
 √  
 √  
 √  
 √  
 √  
 √  
 √  
 √  
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
figure 16
where Si(m) = {Siab(m), Sibc(m), Siac(m)} is the ith selection for the mth particle
(whose hidden variable is λim) with S
i
αβ(m) “selected” and “not-selected” indicated
respectively in its column by “
√
” and “ “.
From schematic (16) we may understand the justification of (5), (15) & (18), leading
to Bell inequalities (6), (10) & (19), in terms of the conditional
given Si and Sj
if ni(α; β) ≃ nj(α; β) and ρiαβ ≃ ρjαβ ∀ i&j (randomness)
then ni(α; β) ≃ n˜i(α; β)→ n˜(α; β) in the large η(Ω) limit.
In terms of error analysis, the first part of the antecedent, ni(α; β) ≃ nj(α; β),
secures against statistical bias, and the second, ρiαβ ≃ ρjαβ , against systematic bias.
With the first part now long established[7]we here consider the second part. And
while its violation would involve a remarkable conspiracy on the part of nature, the
question cannot be answered empirically since the spin distributions are joint over
incompatible observables. It is therefore the absence or impossibility of a selection-
source sequence correlation that we take for the affirmative answer, ρiαβ ≃ ρjαβ .
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In the usual idealized treatment, briefly described above, the experimentalist
secures against the possibility of correlation by delaying the actual direction setting
on a given detector till the very last instant before measurement, sufficiently so
that the bit of selection information, Sj(m′), the detector direction setting, cannot
possibly reach the relevant source element , the opposite particle of the pair with
hidden variable λjm′ , before its spin-projection is measured. As already mentioned,
this requires the establishment of space-like separations between detector settings
and opposite particles. On this condition it might then be said that had one chosen
to measure the spin projection along γ instead of β for a given place selection, the
frequency n(α+; β+, γ+) would have remained essentially unchanged, the condition
illustrated in fig (14). In words,
if, detector-2 had been set to direction γ instead of β (i)
then the hidden variable at particle-1, λαβ ,
would not have changed (to λαγ )
This together with the observations ni(α; β) ≃ nj(α; β) then yields
n(α+; β+, γ+) = n(α+; γ+, β+) in the limit (22)
Claim (i) is a conditional with a false antecedent (detector-2 is set to direction γ),
a counterfactual, with the added property that its consequent ( the hidden variable
is λαβ ) is true, making the claim a semifactual. The attendant reasoning is therefore
called semifactual.
Recall, this is the same reasoning key to the EPR argument, “Had the position
of particle-2 been measured instead of its momentum, the momentum of particle-1
would not have changed”. It follows from an assumption of causal determinism, such
as described e.g. by the conditional, if A then C ( the occurrence of A implying
the occurrence of C ), with the verification criteria implicit: When condition A is
observed, condition C shall always follow or accompany. The semifactual antecedent
likewise refers to the future rather than the past [26]. For example, given the
background
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The day before the drawing Jason choose lottery # 11436.
The winning # was 94325
the semifactual
Had Jason’s number been 94325 instead of 11436
the winning lottery number would still have been 94325
may be restated: If for a future drawing Jason chooses number 94325 given that
there are sufficiently similar world conditions as those before his last choice, he will
win the jackpot. This is of course a prediction, and one whose failure under semi-
factual reasoning would mean that the world conditions had not been sufficiently
similar to those before, that some important factors, possibly hidden, had been
altered. The realist interpretation of quantum mechanics is therefore, via determin-
ism, semifactually definite, where semifactual statements are assigned definite true
or false values.
Quantummechanics, on the other hand, is an essentially statistical and non-deterministic
theory to the extent that it is not always possible to establish event conditionals of
the type, if A then C, e.g. for the events relevant to Young’s double-slit experiment.
In the very formalism sufficient conditions A such as might imply subsequent events
C do not simultaneously appear. Quantum mechanics is, accordingly, semifactually
indefinite. To counter the apparent paradox presented by EPR it is explained in
the present, revised[31], orthodox view that at the time of the momentum mea-
surement on a particle-2 there is an effective momentum measurement also on the
opposite particle-1 via an instantaneous collapse of the wave function [25]. This
forces particle-1 into a state of definite momentum no less than it forces particle-2,
and so, by the EPR definition, excluding p1 as an element of reality. Likewise the
position of particle-1, x1. The view that the only real quantities are measured ones
is thus reasserted.
We here give a schematic showing roughly the context in which the question of
semifactuality enters the motivating discussion regarding the existence of unobserved
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phenomena
i) realist argument:
a) locality + observed conservation
⇒ existence of real-unmeasured quantities (by EPR criterion )
b) locality + observed conservation + counterfactual definiteness
⇒ existence of simultaneous real-unmeasured quantities
⇒ QM incomplete & BI ( ⇒ QM incorrect )
ii) orthodox argument:
a) non-existence of unmeasured quantities + observed conservation
⇒ non-locality
Now to consider the truth value of semifactual (i). The antecedent we denote
“A”, and the consequent “C”. We inquire whether the natural-divergence of the
antecedent from the actual course of events, the historical record, together with
implicit premises converge, in time, back to the original consequent. The implicit
premises here consist of the laws of nature, which we designate L, and world history
up to the time of the antecedent, Wt .To begin, these must form together with the
antecedent a self-consistent set {A,L,Wt}. A semifactual is then determined to be
true when the antecedent is either causally irrelevant or purely-positively relevant
to the consequent. For the present case irrelevance is the appropriate relation. Such
is the inferential program [8] for evaluating natural-divergence semifactuals.
To illustrate, consider the world historical event
Jason turned on the stove
and semifactual
Had Jason not turned on the stove
The kettle would still have come to a boil
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Since there does exist a causal relation between turning on the stove and heating the
kettle (by the laws of physics) the semifactual is determined to be untrue. However,
the semifactal:
Had Jason not tied his shoe-laces
The kettle would still have come to a boil
might be deemed true, assuming no unknown or hidden relation between the tying
of Jason’s shoe-lace and the heating of the kettle.
Careful inspection of (i) however reveals an incompatibility between antecedent
and implicit premises of a type described in Kvart’s excellent work [8] by way of
example:
A piece of butter lies in the middle of a cold, barren expanse,
with no human beings around, at time t ( the middle of winter).
The associated counterfactual:
If this piece of butter had been at a temperature of 175oF at time t,
it would have started to melt.
Given that the expanse is continuously cold at times close to t, the
antecedent-event could not have occurred naturally in accordance with
the prior history of the world up to time t and the laws of nature.
Similarly, the incompatibility in (i) maintains between antecedent A and the exper-
imental facts of the world leading up to A, Wt; it concerns the timing of detector
setting decisions; in practice the decisions are never delayed till the given antecedent
time “t”, immediately preceding the measurement, but are made at a rather earlier
time to as part of the experimental setup. In the famous Orsay experiment [9]
e.g. the stochastic place-selectors are pre-set long before experimental runs begin.
The world prior to t therefore, with a selector set to instruct detector-2 to, at the
appointed time, measure spins along direction β, is incompatible with a counter
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instruction given by antecedent A that the measurements be taken instead along di-
rection γ. And the experimental feasibility of the procedure described by antecedent
A is doubtful given the time constraints involved. Semifactual (i), accordingly, lacks
self-consistency as regards all EPR experiments to date. The general inconsistency
has been noticed by other authors [30] but never examined formally.
6.1 Semifactual self-consistency
An obvious choice for an antecedent Ao that is both consistent with the facts of ex-
perimental procedure and incorporates the effect of A would be that “the stochastic
selector is set differently so as to produce effect A”. It has antecedent time, as re-
quired, no later than pre-experimental place-selection-setting time, to, and we have
with the revised now self-consistent set {Ao, L,Wto} the revised semifactual
if, the place selection had been altered (ii)
then, the spin-state sequence would not have changed
It might now be argued here that we have only replaced one incompatible set of
implicit premises with another since the decision to set the place-selector one way
or the other must be in an experimentalist’s mind before he or she can make the
actual setting. Here we simply recognize the experimentalist’s freedom to choose
indeterministically, i.e., independent of the prior history of the world, Wto , the usual
assumption in EPR analysis [9, 6, 18]. While this freedom is not granted under strict
determinism, it is in line with most common sense notions; more, it is an assumption
made by EPR in deriving the paradox under investigation 2.
2On the status of counterfactuals under strict determinism ref[8] argues for their lack of meaning
from the necessary incompatibility of A with W and L. W and L however are given in the inferential
formalism as sufficient conditions only. And one can easily imagine any number of semi-cyclic
mechanical processes for which counterfactual reasoning does make sense, both under strict and
common-sense determinism, which in such a case are equivalent. Decisive rather are the causal
relations existing between antecedent and events causally relevant to the consequent; the elements
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And so to proceed with the evaluation of semifactual (ii) we test for causal relevance
understood in the Lorentz sense [9, 18, 21, 17] where mutually irrelevant events are
separated by space-like distances. To this end we assign to statements Ao and C
coordinates of the space-time events they describe. To Ao we assign “xo” about
which the physical setting of the place selection by the experimentalist, e.g., by way
of setting a randomizer, is localized. To events C we assign the locus of points {y},
about which the sample to be observed is localized during the experimental runs.
In this notation causal irrelevance is reduced to the condition
(xo − y)2 > 1 (23)
7 Experimental constraints
From (23) let us examine the space-time constraints given by the truth conditions
necessary for semifactuals (i) and (ii) in the visually simple case of a photon source
at the origin; we illustrate the structure in the lab frame with selectors (coincident
with associated detectors) set simultaneously and data taken at a constant rate until
time tf
necessary to W. Kvart’s classification of counterfactuals under strict determinism as world de-dicto,
i.e. lacking real-world meaning, here appears spurious, an artifact of over-specified W and L.
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where open dots indicate events - emissions along the source line (sequence events)
and detector settings along detector lines (selection events). For the representa-
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tive photon emitted at time “t” the necessary truth condition for (i) is satisfied at
detector-1 as the associated detector-2 setting, D′2, made at will by the experimenter
lies outside the photon’s light-cone. The truth condition for (ii) is likewise satisfied
as all pre-determined selections, S(t) : to ≤ t ≤ tf , set at time to also lie outside
the photon’s light-cone. Considered in light of the Orsay experimental parame-
ters where the maximum distance between detector and source, |x|, is 6.5 meters,
the truth condition for semifactual (i) reduces to the requirement that detector-2
settings be made within a maximum of
∆t = 4.4410−8seconds (24)
following each emission to be detected - a time interval that one may compare with
the average human reaction time, ∼ 0.2 seconds.
Alternatively, for semifactual (ii) the running time of the Orsay experiment, tf −
to = 12000seconds, reduces to a detector separation constraint, 2|x| ≥ 9.6 × 1012
meters, which may be compared with the most widely separated EPR experiment
detectors to date, 1.1×104 meters , or with twice the distance to Neptune, 8.7×1012
meters. From another point of view we might consider the conditions under which
real-locality is not violated by the predictions of quantum mechanics. Quantum
mechanics predicts for the coplanar angles θab = θbc =
1
2
θac = 60
o a maximal 25%
violation of BI. The violation may therefore be accounted for within the context of
real locality when the selection and sequence are mutually localized by the time , τ ,
that 3
4
the total data has been taken
to < τ ≤ 1
4
(3tf + to)
on the condition
L = 2|x− y| ≤ 3
4
(tf − to)c
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where c is the speed of light. For the Orsay experiment with, again, runs lasting
12000s the condition reduces to
L ≤ 2.7× 1012m (25)
The condition has been met by every EPR experiment to date. Even if the place-
selection decision is made and physically entered into the EPR apparatus by the
experimentalist within one second of the final measurement, then from the above
constraint at least one spatial dimension of the apparatus must be on the order of
3×108 meters. The longest dimension of the Orsay apparatus turns out to be about
12 meters, and the largest of any to date is about 11 kilometers [29].
Notice that the above stochastic criteria does not call for ”randomness” in the usual
sense of effective indeterminacy. For such effectiveness is fundamentally subjec-
tive, depending upon subjective discernment. It is required rather that the place-
selections and state-sequences remain uncorrelated via causal irrelevance. I.e., the
selection-sequence non-correlation necessary for condition (18) leading to the BI
properly depends upon objective causal irrelevance rather than subjective effective
indeterminacy. To illustrate, consider again semifacual (i), only now imagining as
pictured in fig (1) that antecedent A is experimentally feasible, the experimentalist’s
choice of detector settings being made at will while particles are in mid-flight. In
this case the set {A,L,Wt} is perfectly self-consistent and (i) is determined to be
true even if detector direction choices are ”predictable” with settings e.g. repeating
at regular intervals; at any point during such a run the experimentalist is free to
break the regularity. And so antecedent A, “detector-2 is set to direction γ instead
of β “, would pose no contradiction to the world leading up to the antecedent time, a
world in which detector settings had been chosen, γ,β,γ,β,γ,β,γ, ... or any other
way, e.g. “randomly” from the spins of a roulette wheel. As illustrated in fig(18)
there is no necessary correlation between detector selection D′2 and selections verti-
cally below within the photon’s backward light cone. The same holds with regard to
regularly recurring selections in connection with semifactual (ii). Accordingly, there
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is no objection to the highly predictable detector setting program implemented by
the Orsay experimentalists, and their self-criticism in this regard [10] together with
the recent Geneva “improvements” [29] appear superfluous 3. The EPR detector
randomizing problem as conventionally posed is a pseudo problem.
It is possible to navigate somewhat between the two cases envisaged in semifactuals
(i) and (ii) from which the difficult temporal and spatial constraints, (24) and (25),
are derived. One might consider as a starting point the limiting frequency at which
indeterminacy can be introduced into the experiment, the inverse human reaction
time of 0.2 seconds. E.g., let pre-arranged place-selections be themselves selected
from a large varied set at will by the experimenter at a frequency on the order of
the inverse human reaction time. In this case too, as with constraints (24) and (25),
causal irrelevance between selection and sequence is attained. And the associated
semifactual has the overall structure of (i) with the substructure of (ii) in the sense
that measurements referred to in (i) are replaced by sub place-selections satisfying
(ii). The semifactual might read
if, the sub place-selection had been chosen differently (22)
then, the spin-state sequence would not have changed
where sub place-selections are made every 0.2 s. The truth conditions for (22) we
illustrate in the space-time diagram
3In another recent effort an Austrian group [30] employs a ”physical” and hence ”completely
unpredictable” randomizer ( as opposed to a pseudo-random number generator, its workings, how-
ever complex, being fundamentally deterministic), proposing to demonstrate indeterminacy via
Bell’s inequality by first, it would seem, assuming it.
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Assuming the selection timing can be realized under lab conditions, the accompa-
nying spatial constraint remains considerable - a detector separation of 1.6× 108 m
, about twice the distance to the moon.
8 Conclusions
In light of the in every case discouraging experimental constraints imposed by the
requirements of the Bell inequality it is worth clarifying what is at issue and what
precisely may EPR experimental results resolve; just what is at stake?
The constraints originate from the EPR locality condition. It should be understood
however that the question of physical locality or even that of determinism was
secondary in the thinking and motivation behind EPR’s critique of the orthodox
view, used primarily as a means to show the incompleteness of quantum mechanics
[31, 19, 20]. At bottom was a philosophic issue; that of the nature of reality: whether
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reality can be said to exist apart from the perception of it, EPR taking the affirmative
view. In the opposition, the orthodox view [20]. These philosophic leanings have
been called respectively realistic and idealistic ( or logically positivistic) [31, 18, 26].
We expand the previous schematic to include this background dimension
pre-EPR
i) realist argument : realist world view (real ontology)
⇒ existence of real-unmeasured quantities, QM incomplete
ii) idealist argument : idealist world view (ideal ontology)
⇒ non-existence of unobserved quantities, QM complete
result: No means to verify of dispel either world view; stalemate.
post-EPR
i)realist argument :
a) Locality
⇒ existence of real-unmeasured quantities
b) Locality + counterfactual definiteness
⇒ existence of simultaneous real-unmeasured quantities
⇒ QM incomplete & BI ( ⇒ QM incorrect )
ii) idealist argument :
a) Non-existence of unmeasured quantities
⇒ non-locality
result : Bell inequality as necessary condition for local realism
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And so should faithful EPR experimental data verify BI, then the predictions of
quantum mechanics will be shown incompatible with the results from certain de-
tector setting combinations. On the other hand, should the data violate the BI,
then it is rather local determinism that is found incompatable. Such an outcome
might be understood as resulting from a non-local determinism, e.g., that of Bohm’s
[33], or a local indeterminism or indeed a nonlocal indeterminism, according to one’s
philosophical leanings... The initial question, that of the reality of unobserved phe-
nomena, is in both cases left unanswered.
Non-locality aside, whether a violation of the BI would mean that we live in a
counterfactually definite world, or equivalently, would leave room for the existence
of hidden variables is yet another question, and one best answered in the affirmative
by demonstration of the variables themselves in action, e.g., by way of position and
momentum predictions for a Young’s double-slit type experiment. The negative
proof however would not be as simple, as empirical proofs against logically consistent
possibilities are necessarily inductive, requiring that each out of an in principle
infinite number of possibilities be eliminated. Small wonder then that in over half
a century the hidden variable question has not gone away despite the best efforts
[4, 5, 6, 9, 11, 16, 17, 14, 22]. One will do well to observe the advice of philosopher
Wittgenstein that “as there is only a logical necessity, so there is only a logical
impossibility” ( such as a square-circle), and consider whether a proof against the
existence of hidden variables could be more convincing than the many standing
proofs against... against e.g. the reality of paranormal phenomena4, which is a
different question from whether one believes there to be such phenomena. For
logical necessity, Wittgenstein continues, is tautological [13]. There is a nice quote
in this regard from Pauli in a letter to Born
One should no more wrack one’s brain about the problem of whether some-
thing one cannot know anything about exists all the same, than about the
ancient question of how many angels are able to sit on the point of a needle.
4See for example http://skepdic.com/
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But it seems to me that Einstein’s questions are ultimately always of this
kind. . . .
The tautology might run: Physical variables shall not be hidden. Hidden variables
therefore do not exist 5. It is an irony of history that the reticent philosophy of
Wittgenstein has come to be associated with that of the Copenhagen view.
The question whether a tree falling in the forest makes a sound if no one is there
to hear it has positivistic meaning only in the context of a world view that allows
for causal irrelevance; likewise whether the moon is really there if no one is looking
[14]. To illustrate the difficulty for the scientist, the first of these might also be
rendered ” If a tree falls in the forest and you’re not able to verify it, can you verify
it?” And what then might one ask of the existence of hidden variables? Inquiries
such as these are outside the domain of emperical resolution, and as such best left
to philosophy whose business is precisely their elucidation and analysis6. They do
not belong to science.
8.1 Minimal-mathematics derivations
Lastly, there is a type of BI derivation free of formal mathematics that seems to
have a popular appeal; it can be found e.g. on the internet [11, 12]. The inquiring
5On the other hand Einstein enjoyed only the most affectionate respect among contemporaries,
as he does among today’s scientists - a respect however that sometimes has amusing effects... By all
accounts it was only in deference to Einstein (an otherwise brilliant man!) that his contemporaries
were persuaded to consider the Lorentz locality restriction - as long as one does not take it too
far . The restriction is generally regarded in orthodox circles as a mild embarrassment, one to be
duly recognized then quickly dispatched, often by means of a few slighting remarks on the views of
their realist opponents ( ”conspiratorial”, “paranoid”, “highly artificial”, and so forth.) that tend
to appeal to classical intuitions [18, 19, 5, 24].
6Opposing sides on the philosophic question, as previously mentioned, are often labeled idealist
and realist; the debate in its present form has endured two centuries with no resolution in sight.
For a historical account see e.g. Bertrand Russell’s The Problems of Philosophy , New York:
Oxford University Press (1959); http://www.ditext.com/russell/russell.html
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student should keep in mind that only two EPR measurements may be taken per
particle-pair, i.e., per person, per playing card, per pet, etc., whatever the particle-
pair analogue in a given derivation. This is so because the set of three measurements
taken over the group represented in the BI is actually a set of three measurements
taken respectively over three mutually exclusive subgroups.
Consider for example a derivation in which the quantities to be measured are certain
physical traits of individual humans of a group. For example, their 1) height, with
possible values: tall(t) and short(s), 2) eye color, with possible values: blue(b),
green(g), red( r), etc., 3) gender, with possible values: male(m), female(f), etc..
The measurements could take the form of a questionnaire. One might then be
challenged[12] to find any group for which the inequality
N(t, not− b) +N(b, not−m) ≥ N(t, not−m)
does not hold. But alas, there are no such groups. In light of the preceding the
clever student might now ask whether with prior knowledge of which question-pair
would be put to which of the three sub-groups in an actual survey might it not
be possible to shuffle the members around so as to out-maneuver the inequality, to
exploit the given loophole. An excellent example of this possibility is revealed in
another derivation of this type[32] in itself worth careful consideration. The author
adds ”Bell’s inequalities... give conditions on when a set of marginal probability
distributions could have been derived from a single joint distribution ” apparently
oblivious to EPR experimental limitations. To repeat, now in this language, the
marginal probability distributions may indeed be considered derived from an un-
derlying single joint distribution, but only on the condition that its constituent
sample-space measurements are made randomly, that they remain mutually inde-
pendent of the joint distribution. And it is in turn the above Lorentz constraints
derived from the above self-consistent semifactual that insures this independence.
What the Bell Inequality proves from “EPR” experiments to date beyond a doubt
is that local hidden variables, should they exist, are, if anything, clever - no less
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clever than the microscopic phenomena they describe is peculiar.
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